Abstract-AMT (Automatic IP Multicast without explicit Tunnels) is a specification that has been developed by the Internet Engineering Task Force to address the lack of multicast communication among isolated multicast-enabled sites or hosts, attached to a network with no local multicast support. AMT is designed to provide a mechanism for a migration path to a fully multicast-enabled backbone in the future. As part of a larger project using AMT to extend the reach of multicast sessions, we have performed formal validation of the three-way handshake process between an AMT gateway and its coupled AMT relay by modeling it using the AVISPA tools (Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications). We have identified two security problems where an intruder can impersonate an AMT Relay or an AMT Gateway. Furthermore, an intruder can make use of this impersonation to disconnect valid sessions of other legitimate participants.
I. INTRODUCTION
In IP multicast, applications transmit one copy of a packet to a group of interested receivers at a multicast address, rather than to a single receiver at a unicast address. Multicast depends on the network to forward the packets to only those networks and hosts interested in receiving them, therefore gaining control of the network traffic and reducing the amount of processing on behalf of hosts [1] .
The biggest problem multicast presents today is that it is an "all or nothing" solution [2] . Every link and device on the network between source and receiver, such as router and firewall, requires multicast protocols to be enabled. Additionally, the business model for multicast is abstract and is not an easy case to make. From a business perspective, multicast resembles DNS and BGP, which are important infrastructure protocols that are usually not billed directly. As a result, service providers who attempted to bill for Internet multicast came across disappointing results. Content providers were not interested in paying extra to transmit multicast streams that could not be received by many end users, and networks with many end users were unwilling to pay extra to receive multicast content that did not exist. The result was a chickenand-egg problem between content and audience. To overcome this problem, a transition strategy was proposed by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), called Automatic IP Multicast Without Explicit Tunnels (AMT) [3] . The goal of AMT is to foster the deployment of native IP multicast by enabling a potentially large number of nodes to connect to an already-present multicast provider network. AMT is an interim solution to help build scalable video and other multicast services during the transition to multicast-enabled local service providers. In this paper we demonstrate how we formally validated the three-way handshake of the AMT specification against two security goals, secrecy and authentication. As no previous attempts have been publicly made to assess any sort of such validation of AMT, we believe that our work to be a useful initiative in this direction.
II. MULTICAST CONTENT DELIVERY

A. Challenges Facing Multicast Deployment
As much as multicast looks tempting in theory, it is unfortunately not deployed widely and actively in reality. The present problems with recognizing a multicast service are considered multidimensional [4] , involving several different players such as users who simply want to have access to the content and are not interested in the delivery method, and Internet Service Providers who want to be compensated for delivering extra services that are not easily monetized.
B. Automatic IP Multicast without Explicit Tunnels
Since it is clearly to the advantage of the Content Providers and the transit Network Service Providers to encourage the use of multicast where it is appropriate, a solution is desirable to overcome the challenges mentioned in the previous section. This solution should offer a migration path from a multicastenabled backbone to a fully multicast-enabled network, and allow multicast to reach receivers in networks with no multicast capabilities, without the requirement for any pre-configured tunnels between the receiver and the source. To satisfy this need, AMT (Automatic IP Multicast without explicit Tunnels) has been developed. It allows the benefits of multicast where multicast is deployed, and extends the delivery scope into regions where multicast is unavailable. For more details about the AMT specification, see [3] .
C. AMT Components
The following terminology is mostly adapted from [3] . 1) AMT Site: is a multicast network, or host, with a resident gateway served by an AMT Gateway. It could also operate as a standalone AMT Gateway.
2) AMT Relay: is a multicast router configured to support transit routing between AMT Sites and the native multicast backbone infrastructure. One or more interfaces of the relay router are connected to the native multicast infrastructure, while zero or more interfaces are connected to the non-multicast capable inter-network, and an AMT pseudointerface. The relay router could also operate as a standalone server.
3) AMT Gateway: is a host, or site gateway router, supporting an AMT PseudoInterface. It does not have any interface connected to the multicast backbone infrastructure. AMT Gateways are usually expected to be implemented in two ways: in a network device such as a home gateway or router, or in a host as standalone software.
4) AMT Pseudo-Interface: is a point logically equivalent to an interface where AMT encapsulation (of multicast packets inside unicast packets) occurs. In most (if not all) AMT implementations, the pseudo-interface will be a tunnel endpoint.
D. AMT Three-way Handshake
The term "three-way handshake" is usually associated with the TCP three-way handshake process where it is used to establish and tear down socket reliable connections over the network. UDP, which is employed by AMT, on the other hand, does not involve having a reliable connection between the communicating parties. According to the AMT specification [3] , the three-way handshake, which is used to establish the tunnel, is used only to help avoid spoofing and denial of service (DoS) attacks between the gateway and the relay for each multicast join or leave. However, our formal validation results helped prove that the three-way handshake process is in fact prone to spoofing or impersonation by a third party. By modeling the AMT's three-way handshake process under AVISPA and comparing it with other modeled protocols, we were able to demonstrate that there is an absence of a proper authentication scheme between the participating AMT entities, Relay and Gateway, in addition to lack of proper security in the three-way handshake tunnel establishment.
III. IMPLEMENTATION
A. Formal Verification
There exist three kinds of automated formal verification methods, model checking, equivalence checking, and theorem proving. Model checking takes a given property in hand and tries to verify whether a formally modeled system satisfies it or not [5] . Equivalence checking checks for the equivalence of two models at different abstraction levels [6] . Theorem proving uses mathematical methods to prove the correctness of a system [6] . For our validation requirements, we have chosen the model checker AVISPA tool for our formal analysis because it is powerful, easy to use and open source. It is a project sponsored by the European Union to validate the security goals of different protocols. Already 85% [7] of the IETF protocols were proven by this tool, which has demonstrated its capabilities. AVISPA uses a special language called High Level Protocol Specification Language (HLPSL) to model the protocols. For more details about the HLPSL language, see [8] .
IV. PROBLEM CLASSIFICATION
A. Goals
Since the AMT draft does not explicitly mention any security goals in terms of authentication or secrecy between Gateway and Relay, it is quite safe to assume that we would like the AMT Gateway to identify that it is communicating with a real AMT Relay, and vice versa, and that is after successfully conducting a three-way handshake between both. According to our HLPSL validation results, and given the details of the three-way handshake mentioned in the AMT draft, we have correctly identified one authentication problem where an intruder can present himself as a relay instead of the real one. Details of this attack will be explained later in this section. The security goals chosen for the three-way handshake to be validated against are:
• Mutual authentication between Relay and Gateway through the use of the MAC In this security goal, we validate whether an intruder could be able to impersonate a Relay or a Gateway in an AMT session.
• Secrecy of the MAC In this security goal, we validate whether an intruder could introduce a threat to an existing valid session between an AMT Relay and Gateway after learning the value of the MAC. In other words, we try to look for a replay attack.
• Secrecy of the Local Secret In this security goal, we validate whether an intruder could introduce a threat to an existing valid session between an AMT Relay and Gateway after learning the value of the local secret parameter that is part of the hashed value of the MAC.
V. SCENARIOS
In order to perform validation of the three-way handshake aspect of the protocol, we consider three example scenarios with different intruder and session configuration. We believe that these scenarios can provide realistic and sufficient grounds for identifying the security problems found in the protocol, however, it does not guarantee the security of other possible scenarios. The scenarios are explained as follows:
A. Scenario 1
In this scenario, we are going to compose one session only between Gateway and Relay, and limit the intruder knowledge only to the identities of Gateway and Relay. Figure 1 describes the typical protocol flow for this scenario.
The purpose of this scenario is to model an attack, if found, without explicitly stating that the intruder is impersonating either a Gateway or a Relay, in which case he can easily replay attacks among different sessions. 
B. Scenario 2
Similar to Scenario 1, except that we increase the intruder's knowledge with the cryptographic hashing function. As we show in the results later in this chapter, the additions in this scenario did not affect the results from the first scenario. Figure  1 also describes the typical protocol flow for this scenario.
C. Scenario 3
In this scenario, we are going to compose four parallel sessions, two of which are composed of Relay and Gateway, the other two include the intruder impersonating a Gateway, and then a relay. Intruder knowledge will not be limited. Figure  2 shows the typical flow of the protocol in this scenario. 
VI. VALIDATION RESULTS
For running the AVISPA validation, we used a personal computer running Windows 7, with 4 GB of RAM and an Intel DualCore 2.53 GHz processor. After completing the specification as described above in three scenarios, we divided the validation process into two steps. The first step was to validate the specification using the OFMC [9] back-end tool of AVISPA, and the second step was to use the ATSE back-end [10] . Details of validation results for each goal are explained in the following subsections.
A. Authentication on MAC
According to the AMT draft, the produced MAC is used only for routability purposes by the respondent, and the originator does not need to know anything about it in terms of content or hashing algorithm. As a result, if any party impersonates itself as an authentic relay, the gateway has no way to figure out otherwise. All the scenarios produced the same results, an attack was found where the intruder pretended to be a relay and consequently fooled the Gateway. An attack trace from the third scenario is shown in Figure  3 . It shows a visual protocol flow of scenario 3 where the intruder impersonates a relay. Note than since an intruder can easily impersonate a relay, he will also be able to easily learn unsecured parameters passed with the gateway. 
B. Secrecy of MAC
In all three scenarios, AVISPA found the protocol to be unsafe with regard to this goal, implying that the intruder was able to learn the value of the MAC. This gives rise to a scenario where an intruder may be able to make use of the MAC by sending a Membership update Leave/Done message to the Relay while spoofing the source IP of the Gateway. This can result in the Relay disconnecting the unicast stream to the Gateway.
A run by AVISPA produced the attack trace shown in Figure  4 , illustrating how the intruder was able to learn the value of the MAC in the first scenario. Figure 4 demonstrates the attack trace by showing a visual run of the protocol and how the intruder was able to learn the value of the MAC. 
C. Secrecy of Local Secret
According to [3] , the local secret never has to be shared with the other side, it is only used to verify return routability of the originator. In the light of this knowledge, the Gateway does not care what the local secret or MAC produced by the Relay is, since it simply echoes it back in the AMT membership update message. Even though an intruder can determine the MAC itself, it is not possible to determine the components of the MAC, so an intruder will not be able to learn the value of the local secret. To further confirm this, the validatation results from all three scenarios showed the protocol as safe with respect to this goal for a bounded number of sessions.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented how the AVISPA formal validation tool can be used to validate the proposed security properties of the three-way handshake in the AMT protocol and locate problems accordingly. From our knowledge, there are no previous attempts to validate the three-way handshake or any other part of the AMT protocol. So, we consider our formal validation to be an important step forward in assessing the security of the AMT protocol. The major advantage of our approach is the use of AVISPA toolkit and its HLPSL specification language. The reason is related to the models that this tool allows us to provide for the network and the intruder. The way HLPSL models are implemented assures that a validation process is performed for all the possible topologies that can exist, being given the number and the type of the roles specified. One can observe that the ATSE back-end is faster than the OFMC back-end. However, the two back-ends have been used together, because they apply different algorithms. So if both back-ends report that the protocol is safe, the probability that the actual system accomplishes the security objectives is higher. We restricted the validation to a maximum of four sessions; there was no need to go higher when our goals were validated successfully. The results we obtained for the three scenarios proved to be the same after running them under AVISPA. The results indicated that regardless of the differences we introduced to the number of sessions or intruder's knowledge, the attacks remained the same.
One scenario that needs to be addressed well in the draft is the one where an AMT Gateway could be operating behind a Network Address Translation (NAT) server. A gateway operating behind a NAT can lead it to appear to the Relay as having different source ports with every connection. One possible outcome of this scenario is as follows: 1) After Gateway learns the unicast address of the Relay, it begins three-way handshake and sends an AMT request message and uses a source port SP1. 2) Relay replies with AMT Query message containing MAC, Gateway completes the three-way handshake by replying with a Membership Update message containing the MAC but uses a different source port SP2. 3) When Relay attempts to verify the MAC based on the source IP and port of Gateway, it will get an invalid comparison with original MAC and discard the packet. Examining the scenario explained above, we can conclude that an AMT Gateway must guarantee that it uses the same local port across its communication with the Relay, otherwise it will be required to send a teardown message each time the source port changes to reduce the earlier state created with the Relay. With respect to the security goals discussed in this paper, we suggest encrypting the MAC as a step towards fulfilling the goals. The secret key could be available either dynamically through an intermediate step introduced between the discovery of the Relay and the three-way handshake process where the Relay and the Gateway agree on the key, or having it communicated to them by a trusted third party in an earlier stage. In all cases, we believe that encrypting the MAC is important in terms of narrowing down opportunities for the intruder.
As a postscript, after this paper was submitted, a new version of the AMT specification [11] has been issued that addresses certain of the concerns about operating AMT behind a NAT, and discusses how to prevent certain DoS attacks. However, it does not address our concerns about properly identifying valid relays, or securing the exchanged MAC.
